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1. Introduction 
At the end of April 2003 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a third consultative 
paper (CP3) containing a proposal for a new accord on bank capital (Basel II). The proposal contains 
important changes with respect to an earlier paper, published in January 2001 (CP2). The reform 
process has been undertaken in response to the increase of financial innovations in banking products 
and enhancements in the measurement of banking risks, which have highlighted some inadequacies 
in the simplified framework underlying the 1988 Accord (the “current” Accord). Indeed, the current 
Accord does not fully reflect changes in risk. As a consequence, it may understate the risks and hence 
overstate the capital adequacy of banks. It may also create incentives for banks to make high-risk 
investments. 
A more differentiated assessment of banks’ risk exposures and the provision of incentives to banks to 
improve their risk measurement and management capabilities are the key objectives of the new 
proposal. With regard to the level of overall capital, the Basel Committee has explicitly declared that in 
the standardised approach minimum capital requirements have to bring about a level of capital that is 
on average equal to the current requirement (8%), while banks applying the more advanced 
approaches should receive on average a small capital incentive. 
As is well known, the proposal is based on three pillars - minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
review of banks’ capital adequacy and, market discipline - and foresees a plurality of methods to 
calculate capital requirements, according to the degree of development of banks’ risk management 
systems. 
Through the consultation with the banking industry and three impact studies performed by a large 
number of intermediaries, the Basel Committee has aimed at aligning prudential regulation with the 
best practices of risk management developed in the marketplace. 
Some important changes have been introduced in CP3. The most significant improvements are in the 
field of defining the capital requirements connected with the corporate and retail portfolios. The rise in 
capital requirements with the increase in the borrowers’ probability of default was deemed to be too 
sharp in the proposal issued in January 2001. This would have implied a serious impact on the 
financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which tend to have relatively higher 
probabilities of default than large corporates. In order to comply with higher capital requirements, 
banks would have been induced to increase the interest rates charged to high-risk borrowers or to cut 
the amount of lending.  
Moreover, such a conservative calibration of overall capital was likely to lead to a potential increase in 
the procyclicality of the supply of credit: in times of recession, when the quality of borrowers tended to 
deteriorate, banks would reduce lending (and therefore risk-weighted assets) in order to comply with 
the increase in capital requirements. 
Capital requirements that change according to the riskiness of bank borrowers are a built-in effect of 
any risk-sensitive prudential regulation. What is really relevant is that, even under the current Accord, 
in which essentially all corporate and retail loans are subject to the same capital charge, lending to 
borrowers with a different financial situation is priced at different interest rates and risk premia are 
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usually negatively correlated with the rate of growth of GDP. Such circumstances can also easily be 
recorded for the period before 1988, when no capital regulation was in force at international level. This 
implies that the new regulatory proposal could be blamed for altering the lending policies of banks only 
in the event that the assessment of credit risk implicit in the risk-weight functions substantially differed 
from banks’ perception of risk as reflected in the interest rates they charge to the borrowers. 
The aim of this paper is to provide an empirical evaluation of the impact of the CP3 proposals on the 
lending policies of Italian banks, ie on interest rates on bank loans. We address this issue through two 
separate steps: first, we compare the interest rates charged to a large set of Italian firms with the cost 
brought about by the change in the calculation of capital requirements, so as to have an assessment 
of the impact of the new regulatory scheme on banks’ lending policies; and second, we measure the 
change in interest rates which would be consistent with a sudden deterioration in the cyclical 
conditions of the corporate sector under the new regulatory scheme, in order to have an indication of 
the procyclicality effect embodied in the New Accord. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the main aspects of credit 
risk measurement under the new capital adequacy framework which are relevant for the empirical 
exercises conducted later on; in Section 3 we look at the impact of the proposed capital requirements 
on banks’ loan rates to a large sample of non-financial firms. In Section 4 we conduct a “stress testing” 
exercise, in order to assess the procyclicality of capital requirements on lending conditions in a 
negative economic scenario. Section 5 draws some conclusions. 
2.  CP3: credit risk measurement and the IRB approach 
As regards Pillar 1 of Basel II, the purpose of creating a more risk-sensitive framework is pursued 
through a range of options for addressing credit risk, including: (a) a standardised approach, under 
which risk weights are based on the evaluation of credit quality by external credit assessment 
institutions (rating agencies and other institutions authorised according to a set of specified criteria); 
(b) a “foundation” internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, based on both banks’ internal assessments 
of risk components and supervisory parameters; and (c) an “advanced” IRB approach, in which all risk 
components are estimated internally by banks. 
Both IRB approaches to computing risk-weighted assets rely on four quantitative risk factors: (1) the 
probability of default (PD), which measures the likelihood that the borrower will default over a given 
time horizon; (2) the loss-given-default (LGD), which measures the proportion of the exposure that will 
be lost if default occurs; (3) the exposure at default (EAD), which includes the on-balance sheet 
exposure and an estimate of the off-balance sheet one (as an example, for loan commitments the 
purpose is to measure the amount of the facility that is likely to be drawn if a default occurs); and 
(4) the maturity (M) of the exposure, which measures the remaining economic maturity of the asset. 
For corporate, sovereign and interbank exposures, under the “foundation” IRB approach banks 
satisfying minimum supervisory requirements will be allowed to input their own assessment of the 
probability of default associated with the borrower. The value of the other risk factors, such as EAD, 
LGD and maturity, will be determined by supervisors. Under the advanced IRB approach banks will 
provide internal estimates of LGD, EAD and M as well as PD. 
For each of the relevant portfolios, a risk-weight function translates the risk components into specific 
capital requirements.
2 In the CP2 document only one risk-weight function was established for bank 
exposures to the corporate sector. The formula proposed delivered an 8% capital requirement for a 
benchmark unsecured loan having a 0.7% PD, a 50% LGD and a three-year maturity. 
The comments from financial institutions, other market participants and national authorities, as well as 
the results of an in-depth Quantitative Impact Study on a sample of international banks, and pointed 
out that minimum capital charges tended to exceed current ones under the revised standardised 
approach; in turn, the standardised approach requirements were lower than those computed 
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according to the foundation IRB approach.
3 This was not consistent with the declared objectives of the 
Committee. 
The steepness of the risk-weight curve in the IRB approach for the corporate portfolio was mentioned 
among the factors responsible for such a result. Many comments focused on the impact of the 
proposed regulatory framework on the potential procyclicality effects of the new regulatory scheme 
and on the financing of SMEs, as well as on the treatment of expected losses.
4 
With reference to the expected loss (EL) treatment, it was argued that it did not recognise the specific 
provisions made on loans to offset the capital requirements, or the general provisions not included in 
supplementary capital. This would not encourage adequate provisioning policies and could create 
competitive disadvantages for banks subject to more rigorous prudential standards. 
As regards the procyclicality issue, the influence of capital regulation on the potential propensity of the 
banking system to increase macroeconomic fluctuations is a theme often addressed in the economic 
literature, but it has rarely been possible to come to clear-cut conclusions. While it is widely accepted 
that the banking system is inherently procyclical, it has not been possible to establish a clear link 
between binding capital requirements and macroeconomic outcomes.
5 However, with the new 
regulation a potential fluctuation of capital requirements over the business cycle is to a certain extent 
an inevitable result of the higher risk sensitivity.
6 Since the publication of CP2 the issue of 
procyclicality has therefore stimulated a great debate in the literature; many papers have recently 
addressed the link between credit risk measurement and procyclicality of the financial system, from 
both a theoretical and an empirical point of view.
7 
The main cyclical element in credit risk measurement comes from rating migration; both internal and 
external credit ratings improve during phases of economic expansion and deteriorate during 
contraction, so that measured risk falls in good times and increases in bad times. Therefore, the level 
of capital required by the new proposal will probably rise in economic downturns and fall in 
expansionary phases. The changes can be more pronounced to the extent that rating systems rely on 
market-based information (for example KMV) as opposed to relying on the methods employed by 
credit rating agencies (through-the-cycle ratings). Banks use a variety of rating systems; some are 
similar to the approach followed by KMV or to that of rating agencies. Many banks, however, use 
systems that are in-between, whereby the PD is derived from internal models or from expert judgment 
systems relying heavily on the experience of credit officers. In the latter case, it is not clear how much 
the raters take into account the future evolution of the state of the economy. 
On the other hand, the use of more accurate rating systems is likely to bring about improvements in 
risk management practices; therefore, deteriorations in credit quality should be detected earlier than 
before, and banks could take the appropriate measures. Moreover, even though the regulation does 
not require the rating of borrowers through the cycle, it encourages banks to take greater account of 
uncertainty in economic conditions. In the longer term, banks could choose to run their internal rating 
processes in a way that incorporates greater provision for unexpected events. 
In sum, even with the existing capital standards there is a definite cyclical element in the banking 
system. To the extent that Basel II encourages banks to be more forward-looking, this could reduce 
procyclicality because such behaviour would cause banks to react more quickly to changing conditions 
and expectations. 
As far as loans to SMEs are concerned, it was argued that small firms usually have a higher PD but 
are relatively less sensitive to the evolution of the macroeconomic framework, while large enterprises 
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tend to behave in the opposite way. In other words, small firms’ loans tend to be riskier because of the 
firms’ own specific characteristics; this means the effect of systematic risk on their financial conditions 
is proportionately lower. In the simplified (with respect to fully fledged state-of-the-art credit risk 
models) framework for the determination of IRB capital charges, the effect of systematic risk is 
basically taken into account by the value of the average asset correlation across obligors, which is 
established by the regulators. Therefore, for a given PD of individual borrowers, a portfolio of loans to 
SMEs is less risky than a single loan to a large firm, because the asset correlation is lower, all else 
equal.
8 
On the basis of the comments received and of further empirical evidence, the treatment of exposures 
to corporates, and to SMEs in particular, has been considerably improved. 
In the first place, the steepness of the risk-weight curve has been lowered for all corporate exposures 
by shifting the threshold for neutrality vis-à-vis the 1988 Accord to a 1.0% PD.
9 The reduction in risk 
weights is much stronger for higher PD levels. Therefore, this modification has made it possible to 
significantly reduce the potential degree of procyclicality of the framework and to indirectly take into 
account, at least partially, the SME issue. 
Further, in the IRB approach included in CP3 banks are permitted, separately for any asset class 
(corporate, retail, interbank, etc), to recognise provisions to offset the EL component of the capital 
charge.
10 This modification, in addition to providing incentives to banks to make adequate provisions, 
also makes it possible to reduce the procyclicality of the regulation; specifically, in a downturn the 
possibility to offset the EL charge with provisions reduces the increase in the requirement connected 
with the migration of loans towards lower-quality risk buckets. 
Finally, the Basel Committee has established that in the IRB approach banks would have to conduct 
reasonably conservative stress tests of their own design, with the aim of estimating the extent to which 
their IRB requirements could increase during a stress scenario. The results of these stress tests would 
be used by supervisors in order to ensure that banks were holding a sufficient capital buffer under 
Pillar 2 of the New Accord. 
With reference to the treatment of SME loans, the smaller size of firms has been recognised as a 
factor potentially allowing banks to reduce capital requirements on loans to non-financial firms, other 
things being equal. Specifically, banks will be permitted to distinguish between exposures to large 
firms and those to SMEs, defined as corporate exposures where the reported sales for the 
consolidated group of which the firm is a part are lower than €50 million. Loans to SMEs will attract a 
capital requirement, for a given PD, LGD and maturity, lower than that attracted by larger firms. The 
capital reduction increases linearly from 0% to 20% with sales going from €50 to €5 million, and 
remains at 20% for firms with sales figures lower than the latter threshold. 
Moreover, loans extended to small businesses can be treated according to the risk-weight formula 
established for the retail portfolio provided that: (a) each of them represents a small portion of a large 
pool of loans with similar risk characteristics which are managed by the bank on a pooled basis; 
(b) the total exposure of the banking group to an individual small business is less than €1 million. In 
this case, the capital requirements are lower than those for SMEs classified in the corporate portfolio, 
all else equal. 
A third Quantitative Impact Study (QIS3) was performed between October and December 2002 with 
the cooperation of 365 banks from 43 countries. A total of 188 G10 banks were divided into two 
groups: Group 1 is representative of the large and internationally active banks; Group 2 includes 
smaller and, in many cases, more specialised banks. 
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Although banks did not succeed in completely simulating the provisions of the new regulation, as 
regards, for example, the range of collateral instruments allowed or a more clear-cut separation across 
portfolios because of shortcomings in their information systems, on the whole the results are 
consistent with the Committee’s objectives: (1) minimum capital requirements would be broadly 
unchanged for Group 1 banks, which are likely to use IRB approaches; (2) for Group 2 banks capital 
requirements under the IRB approach could be substantially lower than under the current Accord, due 
to the relatively larger size of retail portfolios. 
Within the IRB approach, capital requirements for the financing of the corporate sector are lower than 
under the current Accord for both Group 1 and Group 2 banks, in connection with the higher quality of 
the borrowers. As expected, capital requirements both on loans to SMEs treated as corporate and on 
loans to small businesses included in the retail portfolio also turn out lower than currently. Overall, 
capital requirements for credit risk show a sharp reduction in comparison with the current Accord 
especially for Group 2 banks, thanks above all to the better treatment of retail portfolios. However, the 
overall result is substantially affected by the operational risk requirement.
11 
3.  The impact of the new capital requirements on the pricing of bank loans 
The results of QIS3 have confirmed the improvements that have been made in the proposed 
regulation. 
However, this is not enough to be able to argue that banks’ lending policies will not be distorted by the 
new regulatory framework. In the current situation, given the dispersion of interest rates by economic 
sectors and geographical areas (Graph 1), the pricing of individual bank loans is unlikely to be affected 
by the flat capital requirement.  
In general terms, the pricing of bank loans reflects both financial and operating costs, the market 
power of the bank, and a risk premium computed by the bank according to its internal procedures, in 
some cases through VaR methodologies. In the context of the IRB approach, internal ratings and 
default and loss estimates must play an essential role in the credit approval, risk management and 
internal capital allocation functions of banks using this approach. This implies that a potential change 
in lending policies could be introduced if the regulatory treatment of credit risk were inconsistent with 
the internal assessments of banks, as reflected in the pricing of their lending operations. 
We define the overall risk component, ORC, (or the “total regulatory cost of risk”) of any lending 
operation, measured as a percentage of the nominal exposure, as: ORC = EL/EAD + k(REQ-EL)/EAD, 
where EL is the expected loss, REQ is the capital requirement as measured in CP3, k is the rate of 
return on bank capital and EAD is the nominal exposure. Since the CP3 capital requirement includes 
both EL and UL (unexpected loss), the formula is equivalent to: ORC = EL/EAD + k*UL/EAD. 
In order to measure the capital requirement connected with each lending operation we need estimates 
of all relevant risk parameters. In the context of the IRB foundation approach, we derived an estimate 
of the probability of default of each borrower, while we used the supervisory parameters for the loss-
given-default (ie, we considered all the exposures as uncollateralised) and maturity. As to EAD, we 
considered only the on-balance sheet nominal amount.  
We refer to the Italian framework, for which a large amount of data on both lending relationships and 
balance sheets of industrial and commercial firms is available. Quantitative information can be drawn 
from CERVED’s Company Accounts Register and from the Credit Register run by the Bank of Italy. In 
the Company Accounts Register both the balance sheets and the profit and loss accounts of a large 
set of Italian firms have been collected since 1993 according to a simplified reclassification scheme 
including 70 elementary items. The Credit Register records individual credit positions above 
approximately €75,000; non-performing loans are recorded no matter what their amount. The interest 
rates charged to individual borrowers by individual banks are also available, with reference to a 
sample of 68 banks accounting for 80% of total loans. 
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3.1  Measuring probabilities of default and capital requirements 
The probabilities of default of a large sample of corporate borrowers are estimated on the basis of a 
scoring model developed for research purposes at the Bank of Italy. A logit model is used in order to 
distinguish sound from insolvent firms.
12 In particular, balance sheet data at time t and Credit Register 
information at time t + 1 are used to assess the probability for each firm of being recorded as defaulted 
at time t + 2. A firm is regarded as defaulted if it is reported in the Credit Register’s bad debt category 
for the first time in the year t + 2 by at least one lending bank. 
In the Credit Register bad debts are defined as all exposures to insolvent borrowers, regardless of any 
collateral received. Debtors are considered insolvent if they are globally unable to cover their financial 
obligations and are not expected to recover, even if this does not result in a legal bankruptcy 
procedure.
13 
The estimation procedure was applied to a set of 180,000 firms divided into four sectors of economic 
activity (manufacturing, trade, construction and services); a separate regression model was estimated 
for each sector. Through a stepwise procedure, 11 significant explanatory variables were selected out 
of about 30 ratios proxying for profitability, productivity, liquidity, financial structure, tension in credit 
relationships, growth, size and geographical location of the enterprises (Table 1). 
For each model, two thirds of the firms were used for the estimation; the rest were used to test out of 
sample. Since in the estimation sample the proportion of sound and insolvent firms mimics that of the 
universe, the forecast values of the logistic regression can be regarded as the probability of default of 
the individual firms within one year. The overall correct classification rate - the fraction of firms that are 
correctly classified by the model as sound or insolvent - is around 74% on average (Table 2). Out of 
sample, similar percentages are observed for both sound and insolvent firms. The overall performance 
is also assessed using the power curve (or “Gini curve”), considering the results of the model out of 
the sample in the year of estimation and the full sample in other periods. This curve measures the 
discriminatory power of the function; that is, the overall ability of the model to distinguish sound from 
insolvent firms. A related measure is the accuracy ratio, the ratio of the area between the power curve 
and the random model to the area between a perfect model and the random model. The model 
produced an accuracy ratio of 65% for the control sample and of 66-67% for each of the years 2001, 
1999 and 1998 (Graph 2). The value of accuracy ratios mentioned in studies regarding other countries 
normally ranges between 50 and 70%.
14 In the following application we consider 104,300 firms for 
which, in addition to an estimate of the probability of default, interest rates on credit lines are also 
available. The sample accounts for nearly 40% of total corporate loans of the banks for which interest 
rates are known. A set of about 255,000 credit relationships is considered. 
The sample includes both large companies and SMEs (Table 3):
15 
●  1,900 firms with sales higher than €50 million account for 2% of those included in the sample 
and for 41% of lending to the sample; 
●  20,000 firms with annual sales between €5 and €50 million represent 19% of the sample and 
37% of loans. As mentioned above, in the new regulatory proposal capital requirements on 
loans to these firms are reduced by up to 20% relative to larger firms; 
●  46,000 firms with sales of less than €5 million and an exposure higher than €1 million 
account for 44% of the total number of enterprises and for almost 19% of lending. Capital 
requirements on these exposures are reduced by 20%, other things being equal, relative to 
larger firms; 
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●  finally, 36,000 firms accounting for 35% of the sample and 4% of total lending could be 
included in the retail portfolio provided their exposures are managed as part of a portfolio 
segment. 
The probabilities of default of these firms have been estimated on the basis of company accounts for 
2000 and credit relationships for 2001. Therefore their PDs represent an estimate of the default rate 
in 2002. 
Their average value, weighted by the amount of lending, turns out to be 0.93%, lower than the default 
rate of all bank corporate borrowers recorded in the Credit Register (1.3% in 2002). The gap is mainly 
due to the overrepresentation of big firms in the sample in relation to smaller firms. 
By applying the risk-weight functions contained in CP3, it is possible to obtain a proxy of the new 
capital requirements. 
For the whole sample, the overall minimum capital requirements would be equal to 5.8% of total 
exposures (Table 4). However, results have to be interpreted with caution, given the data limitations, 
the narrower default definition adopted, and the bias of the sample towards better credit quality with 
respect to the average of banks’ corporate borrowers. 
3.2  Risk assessment and interest rates 
As already mentioned, the impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on the pricing of bank loans can be 
checked by comparing the risk assessment of lending operations that is implicit in the CP3 document 
and the interest rates currently charged to borrowers. Since we assume that loans are senior 
unsecured, only the interest rates on short-term loans are considered; collateral should be less 
relevant in this case. 
As a general point, Graph 3 shows an increasing relationship between firms’ riskiness and the average 
interest rate on the loans granted to the firms in the same risk class, even though there is a substantial 
variation around the mean. A significant relationship is confirmed by a simple regression on cross 
section data. Similarly, the comparison between the average rate charged by each bank to its own 
borrowers and the average riskiness of the same borrowers also shows an increasing relationship 
between the two variables (Graph 4). 
This evidence supports the reliability of our assessment of the financial conditions of bank borrowers 
and strengthens the results regarding the impact of the new capital adequacy framework on banks’ 
lending policies to the sample of non-financial firms considered. 
In the simplified formula we have adopted to measure the overall risk component of lending, that is, 
EL/EAD  +  k(REQ – EL)/EAD, the value of k, the rate of return on bank capital, is proxied by a 
weighted average of the pre-tax return on equity and of the interest rate on subordinated debt, net of 
the interest rate on risk-free assets (in which it is assumed that own funds are invested). As a result, 
for 2001 the rate of return on bank capital turned out to be equal to 10.3%. For the whole sample, the 
risk component ranges between 0.25 and 2% for the loans to borrowers with a PD not higher than 4%; 
its average value is 0.97%. 
The risk component tends to be relatively low for larger firms, as a consequence of lower PDs; on the 
other hand, smaller borrowers can benefit from a favourable treatment in the definition of capital 
requirements. For firms with reported sales higher than €50 million the average risk component is 
equal to 0.85%, whereas it turns out to be 0.95% for firms with sales up to €5 million. The average risk 
component peaks at 1.2% both for corporate firms with sales lower than €5 million and for those 
included in the retail portfolio. 
In Graphs 5-9 the change in the overall risk component of lending operations related to borrowers of 
different quality, as measured according to CP3, can be compared with the corresponding increase in 
the interest rates on loans. In this framework, we are not interested in explaining the level of the 
interest rates, which is influenced by several other factors. On the contrary, we are interested in their 
changes along the whole spectrum of the borrowers’ PDs. 
For corporate and retail portfolios the two variables, ie overall risk component and short-term interest 
rates, move together in response to an increase of the borrowers’ PDs.   
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This evidence indicates that the risk-weight functions included in the new capital adequacy framework, 
for a given risk, are on average consistent with banks’ pricing decisions. As a consequence, lending 
decisions are unlikely to be altered by the introduction of the regulatory scheme. 
4.  New capital requirements and procyclicality: a stress testing exercise 
The potential impact of the new capital requirements on the pricing of bank loans has been assessed 
with reference to a period in which the overall quality of credit was particularly good in Italy. Indeed, in 
recent years the favourable trend of corporate profitability has been reflected in improved loan quality. 
Moreover, Italian banks have tended to direct their lending to less risky counterparties across 
borrowers of different sizes, economic sectors and geographical areas. Therefore, the result according 
to which the new capital adequacy framework is not likely to alter the lending decisions of banks needs 
to be made more robust by considering an unfavourable cyclical situation. For this purpose it is 
necessary to simulate a sudden deterioration of the financial condition of the corporate sector. 
This amounts to dealing with the problem of procyclicality of loan supply in the framework of the 
New Accord, namely assessing the impact of the new capital requirements on lending decisions in the 
context of an economic slowdown. In fact, if capital requirements were to react too severely to an 
increase in the riskiness of lending activity, banks could decide to sharply restrict the supply of loans, 
thereby contributing to a further deterioration of the macroeconomic environment. 
A certain degree of procyclicality in banks’ lending decisions is a common experience of all countries: 
a slowdown in economic activity tends to be considered as an early indicator of increased financial 
fragility of the corporate sector and to be reflected in higher risk premiums on lending operations. 
In order to perform a stress test with reference to the Italian economy, we tried to replicate the 
financial conditions of corporate borrowers in the recession that occurred in Italy at the beginning of 
the 1990s (a “worst case” scenario). The slowdown started in the second quarter of 1992; the 
percentage change of GDP with respect to the corresponding quarter of the previous year turned out 
to be negative in real terms in the last quarter of 1992 and in the first three quarters of 1993. In 1993 
Italy’s gross domestic product declined by 0.9% at constant prices, the first contraction since 1975. 
The economic recovery took place in 1994, as a consequence of an acceleration of export growth 
driven by the fall in the exchange rate and wage moderation in the framework of increased world 
trade. However, in banks’ balance sheets the volume of bad debts and substandard loans continued 
to increase substantially for some years: bad debts peaked at 10% as a ratio to total loans in 1997, 
although in the following years this ratio rapidly decreased, down to 4.5% at the end of 2002, partly as 
a result of loan securitisation. 
A small number of financial ratios is sufficient to describe the severity of the financial situation of the 
industrial and commercial firms in the 1992-93 recession and the improvements recorded in the most 
recent period (Graph 10): (1) gross operating profit as a ratio to value added recorded its minimum 
value in the 1990-92 period: 37.7% as opposed to 40.6% in the second half of the 1980s and 44.4% 
in 2001; (2) net financial costs increased from a yearly average of 22.2% of gross operating profit in 
the 1985-89 period to a peak value of 29.7% in 1992; they were equal to 3.4% in 2001; (3) the return 
on assets was negative in 1992 and 1993, as opposed to 2.1% in the second half of the 1980s; it was 
equal to 1.1% in 2001; (4) leverage peaked at 60% in 1992 and 1993, from 56.5% in the second half 
of the 1980s; it was equal to 50.7% in 2001. 
In order to set up a distressed scenario, we compute: (a) the PDs of individual firms consistent with the 
financial situation of the Italian corporate sector at that time; (b) the corresponding capital 
requirements according to CP3; and (c) the overall risk component of each credit relationship. 
The increase of the overall risk component with respect to the present situation provides a proxy of the 
increase we should expect to observe in the interest rate (net of the risk-free rate) charged to each 
borrower.  
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4.1  Measuring PDs in a distressed scenario 
Data on firms’ balance sheets starts in 1993; we therefore use both financial ratios and credit 
relationships as of 1993 in order to simulate a sudden deterioration in the probabilities of default of the 
corporate borrowers included in our sample for 2002. 
The assumptions underlying this calculation are: (1) the logit regression estimated for recent years is 
also suited to estimating probabilities of default for the past. In fact, we did not check whether there 
could be a better algorithm to proxy the financial health of Italian firms in those years. However, we 
compared the ex post effective default rate in 1994, relative to the 1993 sample of firms, with the ex 
ante estimates and the results were satisfactory for all risk classes; (2) the shocks affecting the 
macroeconomic scenario are completely incorporated in the micro-variables used in the exercise, the 
impact on which is different depending on the economic sector, geographical area and size of the 
firms considered.  
Finally, we assume that the downturn materialises suddenly and abruptly, starting from the relatively 
good situation for banks’ portfolios recorded in 2001, whereas usually a slowdown in economic activity 
unfolds gradually over time. Moreover, as a result of capital requirements directly linked to the 
probability of default on loans, banks should usually behave more proactively, continuously adjusting 
bank capital and loan loss reserves to changes in the quality of their portfolios. 
In order to compute the PDs in the distressed scenario we use all the information contained in the 
original set of 188,000 non-financial firms. However, the final results in terms of lending policies refer 
to the sample of 104,000 corporate borrowers for which information on loan rates is also available. 
About 64,000 firms out of the 188,000, accounting for 56% of the loans extended by banks to the firms 
in the 2002 sample, were recorded both in CERVED’s Company Accounts Register and in the Credit 
Register in 1993. For these firms we simply used the 1993 data to calculate the PDs.  
For the 124,000 firms which are not included in the 1993 sample, we have modified the 2000 balance 
sheet values and the 2001 credit relationship indicators so as to reproduce on average the values 
recorded in 1993 by economic sector, geographical area and size, thereby maintaining relative 
differences among firms. 
The simulated deterioration in the financial conditions of the corporate sector can be better assessed 
on the basis of the transition matrices referring both to the number of the firms and to the overall 
amounts of their financing. The ratio of borrowers included in the first two classes (PDs not higher than 
0.45%) shrinks from 27.2% to 16.5% as a number (Table 5) and from 31.3 to 19.9 as a percentage of 
total bank loans (Table 6). On the other hand, the number of firms for which the PD exceeds 1% 
increases from 29.4% to 43%, whereas their overall lending increases from 20.3% to 33.3% of the 
total. 
The average PD, which was 1.27% in 2002, would increase to 1.79%, as opposed to 1.51% recorded 
in 1994 for all the firms included in CERVED’s Company Accounts Register. The weighted average 
PD would increase from 0.97% to 1.4%, as compared with an actual default rate of 1.87% in 1994 in 
CERVED’s database.  
Such a sudden deterioration of the macroeconomic framework would involve a 16% increase in the 
overall minimum capital requirements. At the end of 2002 the overall capital buffer of the Italian 
banking system was equal to 40% of the minimum amount of capital required. 
4.2  Capital requirements and interest rates in a distressed scenario 
The results of the stress test provide a first indication regarding the reduction of potential procyclicality 
effects of the New Accord relative to the proposal issued in January 2001. Indeed, the application of 
the risk-weight function contained in CP2 would have implied a 24% increase in the overall minimum 
capital requirement for this set of loans. 
However, we are more interested in assessing whether the risk measurement implicit in the new 
regulatory scheme would force banks to charge their customers exceptionally high loan rates when 
confronted with an adverse macroeconomic scenario. If this were true, we should conclude that the 
New Accord would anyway involve an increase in the procyclicality of banks’ lending decisions. In the 
opposite case, the change in the capital regulation would turn out to be at least neutral in relation to 
the current situation.  
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Similarly to the exercise we performed on the more recent data, we can compare the overall risk 
component of lending operations as computed on the basis of the distressed PDs with the interest 
rates which were actually recorded at the time of the recession. For each credit line, the increase of 
the overall risk component provides a proxy of the increase we should expect to observe in the interest 
rates on credit lines. 
Unfortunately, the comparison can be performed only to a limited extent, due to data limitations. Ten 
years ago only 20,000 firms out of the 104,000 that are included in our sample were financed by 
banks participating in the survey on interest rates. For this reason, we complement the comparison 
based on individual data with the observation of the differential between the average short-term 
lending rate and the rate of return on treasury bills. 
Graph 11 shows that the risk premium on lending operations increased sharply during the 1992-93 
recession. The increase in the second half of the 1990s was not connected with concerns regarding 
firms’ financial situation, since banks’ interest rates were decreasing and corporate profitability strongly 
improving. On the contrary, it was linked to the convergence of domestic monetary conditions towards 
the situation prevailing in the other leading European countries, consistent with the reduction of actual 
and expected inflation in Italy. Finally, some increase in the risk premium on bank loans was 
observable at the end of 2000, when a deterioration of the macroeconomic environment also took 
place. 
By applying the risk-weight functions included in CP3 to the PDs referring to the 1993 situation, it is 
possible to compute the overall risk component of lending operations that is consistent with a 
distressed scenario. For the whole sample of 104,000 firms, the average risk component comes out a 
quarter of a percentage point higher than in 2002: 1.22% compared with 0.97%. Its increase ranges 
between 18 basis points for firms with reported sales higher than €50 million and 35 basis points for 
firms with sales between €50 and €5 million and for those included in the retail portfolio. 
As a consequence, the lending rates (net of the risk-free rate) should increase on average by a quarter 
of a percentage point, starting from the value of 2.9 percentage points recorded at the end of 2002. 
The new level, although quite high, would not reach peak values relative to those recorded in the 
previous recession. As a matter of fact, it would be between the two values observed in 1992 and 
1993, which were 2.6% and 3.6% respectively. 
A more detailed analysis can be performed with respect to the 20,000 companies for which the interest 
rates on credit relationships in 1993-94 are available and for a subset of 7,000 firms with sales 
between €5 and €50 million. 
Graphs 12 and 13 differ slightly from the corresponding Graphs 9 and 6. The low number of firms 
included in the first risk bucket made it difficult to use this class as a benchmark; we therefore 
considered the levels of the average interest rates corresponding to the firms included in each bucket. 
The results achieved for the more recent period are basically confirmed: even in a distressed 
macroeconomic environment, the interest rates charged to borrowers in 1994 move together with the 
overall risk component of lending operations as credit quality deteriorates. This seems to imply that, as 
a consequence of the new regulatory scheme, banks are not induced to behave in a more procyclical 
way than in the past. Thus, the New Basel Capital Accord is unlikely to alter banks’ decisions 
regarding the financing of the economy even under a distressed scenario. 
Indeed, the new regulation will stimulate the banking industry to introduce more forward-looking 
elements in the assignment of ratings, in order to make judgments less correlated with the business 
cycle. Moreover, the role of provisions in offsetting expected losses, as well as the need for banks to 
continuously adjust their capital endowments to changing risk, could actually reduce the procyclicality 
of loan supply. 
5. Conclusions 
The New Basel Capital Accord can promote a vast improvement in the risk measurement and 
management practices of banks. The flexibility of the approach allows regulation to adapt to 
institutions of different size and sophistication.  
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Among the issues that emerged after the publication of the January 2001 consultative document was 
the need to prevent any difficulty in the financing of small and medium-sized firms and to balance the 
goal of a higher risk sensitivity of capital requirements with the potential amplification of business cycle 
fluctuations. As confirmed by the results of the Quantitative Impact Study recently conducted by the 
Basel Committee (QIS3), the changes made to the original proposal and contained in the third 
consultative document reduce the capital charges for almost any risk level and deal better with the 
peculiarities of credit risk in the case of SMEs. 
As a result of the new treatment of credit risk, the exposures to a substantial share of borrowers will 
attract a capital charge for credit risk lower than 8%. However, this is not sufficient to argue that banks’ 
lending decisions will not be distorted by the application of the new framework. What is relevant is 
whether the assessment of credit risk implicit in the new regulatory scheme (CP3) substantially differs 
from the banks’ own evaluation, as embodied in their lending rates. 
With reference to a large sample of Italian firms, for which the probabilities of default have been 
computed on the basis of their balance sheets and credit relationships, we compared the change in 
the overall risk component of lending operations, defined according to the foundation IRB approach, 
with the interest rates charged by banks on individual credit lines at a recent date. Since we find that 
the two variables move together in response to an increase of the borrowers’ PDs, we tend to 
conclude that the CP3 approach to measuring credit risk is consistent with banks’ risk assessment. 
This result is supported by the finding that the same relationship also holds in a distressed scenario 
which replicates the financial condition of the Italian corporate sector in the 1993-94 recession. This 
provides an indication that the procyclicality of loan supply is not strengthened by capital requirements 
more strictly related to the riskiness of lending operations.  
On the basis of this empirical evidence, we do not expect loan pricing to be distorted as a 
consequence of the new capital adequacy framework.  
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Table 1 





Manufacturing Trade  Construction  Services 
“Geographical” (dummy) variables      
Central Italy  **  *  **  – 
Southern Italy  ***  ***  –  – 
“Credit Register” variables      
Drawn/granted amount (y avg)  ***  ***  –  *** 
Overshoot (avg no)  ***  ***  ***  *** 
∆ (Drawn/granted amount)  *** *  –  – 
“Balance sheet register” variables      
Value added/total assets  –  **  –  – 
Current assets/current liabilities  ***  –  –  – 
Cash flow/total assets  ***  –  –  *** 
Coverage ratio  **  **  **  – 
Leverage  ratio  *** *** *** *** 
Long-term debt/total debt  –  –  –  *** 





Estimating the probability of default of non-financial firms 
Performance of the logistic regression model 
Sample composition  “Correct classification” rate (%) 








Sound Insolvent Sound Insolvent 
Manufacturing 46,683    585 1.2  74.7 74.9 74.6 71.7 
Trade 28,949    387  1.3  75.1 74.9 75.7 73.7 
Construction 17,282    323  1.8  72.7 72.4 72.1 70.7 
Services 22,915    242  1.0  75.0 74.8 75.2 81.8 

























The sample: number of firms and bank debt by risk bucket 
Total sales 
>€50 million (share)  €5-50 million (share)  <€5 million (share)  “Retail” (share) Total  (share)  Risk buckets (PDs) 
No Debt No Debt No Debt No Debt No Debt 
0.00-0.15% 11.4  5.2  7.5 3.5 5.3 2.5 3.8 2.2 5.3 4.0 
0.15-0.45% 33.4  35.9  27.0 23.9 21.8 17.7 18.5 14.4 21.9 27.3 
0.45-0.70% 26.2  30.3  25.4 25.6 21.9 18.8 18.7 15.8 21.5 25.9 
0.70-1.00% 18.3  19.5  22.8 25.5 23.0 23.5 20.3 20.8 21.9 22.5 
1.00-2.00% 8.0  6.7  12.8 16.1 18.1 23.5 21.0 24.4 17.9 13.9 
2.00-4.00% 1.8  2.0  2.8 3.5 5.4 7.3 8.8 11.1  6.0  3.9 
>4.00%  0.8 0.4 1.8 2.0 4.5 6.9 8.9  11.3 5.5 2.6 
Number of firms    1,915    20,078   45,935  36,381   104,309 
Bank loans  79,605  71,802 36,354    7,333  195,093 






























Expected losses  
(%) 
Capital requirements  
(%) 
Risk components  
(%) 
0.00-0.15% 7,729  4.0 0.04  2.09 0.25 
0.15-0.45% 53,201  27.3 0.14  4.06 0.54 
0.45-0.70% 50,502  25.9 0.26  5.63 0.82 
0.70-1.00% 43,898  22.5 0.38  6.41 1.00 
1.00-2.00% 27,201  13.9 0.58  7.21 1.26 
2.00-4.00% 7,529  3.9 1.24  9.27 2.07 
>4.00%  5,033  2.6 3.83 16.38 6.40 
























  Table 5 
Stress test: transition matrix for the whole sample 
Number of firms 









0.00-0.15% 0.15-0.45% 0.45-0.70% 0.70-1.00% 1.00-2.00% 2.00-4.00%  >4.00%  Total Shares 
0.00-0.15% 5,534  5.3  44.2 35.6  9.2  5.2  3.8 1.4  0.8  100.0 2.3 
0.15-0.45% 22,821  21.9 –  56.2  25.3  8.9  5.9 2.3  1.4  100.0  14.2 
0.45-0.70% 22,450  21.5  –  –  55.3 28.8 10.1  3.4  2.4 100.0  17.9 
0.70-1.00% 22,852  21.9  –  –  –  64.5 27.5  4.4  3.6 100.0  22.6 
1.00-2.00% 18,701  17.9  –  –  – –  76.9  17.7  5.4 100.0  23.4 
2.00-4.00% 6,258  6.0  –  –  – – –  73.9  26.1  100.0  9.9 
>4.00%  5,693 5.5 –  –  –  –  – –  100.0  100.0  9.7 

























Stress test: transition matrix for the whole sample 
Bank debt 









0.00-0.15% 0.15-0.45% 0.45-0.70% 0.70-1.00% 1.00-2.00% 2.00-4.00%  >4.00%  Total Shares 
0.00-0.15% 7,729  4.0  35.0 44.5 13.3  2.6  2.8 1.6 0.3  100.0 1.4 
0.15-0.45% 53,201  27.3 –  61.5  25.4 6.3 4.6 1.3 1.0  100.0  18.5 
0.45-0.70% 50,502  25.9  –  –  53.8 33.6  9.4  2.0  1.3 100.0  21.4 
0.70-1.00% 43,898  22.5  –  –  –  65.7 25.5  5.0  3.8 100.0  25.3 
1.00-2.00% 27,201  13.9  –  –  – -  83.1  11.4  5.5  100.0  21.1 
2.00-4.00% 7,529  3.9  –  –  – – –  80.5  19.5  100.0  6.8 
>4.00%  5,033  2.6  – – – – – –  100.0  100.0  5.5 
Total 195,093  100.0 1.4  18.5  21.4 25.3 21.1  6.8  5.5 100.0 100.0 
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Graph 1 
Interest rates on bank loans 
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Changes in ORCs and interest rates by risk bucket 
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Source: Credit Register. 
 
Gross op profit/value added (lhs) 
 










































Interest rate on short-term lending (rhs) 
Percentage changes of GDP at constant prices (lhs)




























































Risk buckets (probabilities of default) 



























ORCs and interest rates by risk bucket in a distressed scenario 
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